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Abstract 
 
OPEC’s stated mission is to promote the economic development and growth of its 
member states while minimizing volatility in the oil markets. But after a promising 
beginning many member states’ economies have declined rather than prospered—a 
clear indication of OPEC’s failure to meet their development goals. Thus, we ask if a 
resource cartel can achieve the joint goals of development and resource market 
stability. In a model in which oil producing countries choose whether to join an oil 
cartel or remain in the fringe, we find that, in a highly elastic oil market, a profit 
maximizing cartel is inconsistent with oil market stability in the face of demand shocks. 
Thus, it is inimical to macroeconomic stability, an essential requirement for long-lasting 
capital investment, and therefore economic development and growth. Consequently, it 
may not be optimal for an oil-exporting country that cares adequately about 
macroeconomic stability to join the cartel. But for a country where short-run 
considerations overwhelm long-run concerns, cartel membership may be the correct 
choice. Yet the oil rich are ultimately cursed by their excessive reliance on their 
resource wealth—current profligacy begets future decline. 
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Abstrakt 
 
Misí OPECu je prosazovat a podporovat ekonomický vývoj a růst svých členských států 
a minimalizovat volatilitu na trhu ropných produktů. Po slibném začátku mnoho 
ekonomik členských států výkonnostně pokleslo spíše než prosperovalo, což je 
znamením selhání OPECu při plnění svých cílů. Z tohoto důvodu se ptáme jestli 
surovinový kartel může dosáhnout dvou společných cílů ekonomického vývoje a 
stability trhu zdrojů. V modelu, ve kterém země produkující ropu vybírají zda se přidají 
k ropnému kartelu či nikoli zjišťujeme, že na vysoce elastickém trhu ropy je kartel 
maximalizující zisk a vystavený poptávkovým šokům neslučitelný s tržní stabilitou. 
Proto je tento škodlivý pro makroekonomickou stabilitu jakožto základní požadavek pro 
dlouhotrvající kapitálové investice a tedy i ekonomický rozvoj a růst. Následně by pro 
zemi exportující ropu a přiměřeně se zaměřující na makroekonomickou stabilitu 
nemuselo být výhodné připojovat se ke kartelu. Na druhou stranu pro zemi, kde 
krátkodobé úvahy převáží nad těmi dlouhodobými, může být členství v kartelu dobrou 
volbou. Přesto jsou státy bohaté na ropu nakonec negativně ovlivněny svým přehnaným 
spoléháním se na své nerostné bohatství - současná rozmařilost působí budoucí 
ekonomický pokles.  
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INTRODUCTION 
“OPEC is an international Organization of eleven developing countries which are 
heavily reliant on oil revenues as their main source of income. Membership is open to 
any country which is a substantial net exporter of oil and which shares the ideals of the 
Organization.” 
“Since oil revenues are so vital for the economic development of these nations, they aim 
to bring stability and harmony to the oil market by adjusting their oil output to help 
ensure a balance between supply and demand.”  
OPEC 
 
OPEC was formed to promote economic development in its member countries and to 
minimize the volatility of oil markets. To accomplish these combined goals, the cartel 
uses its market power to sustain a high, stable price of oil to generate high, stable 
income for its members. Yet, the recent experience of most OPEC countries has not 
been one of relative prosperity but rather one of relative decline (Cordesman, 1999).  
In this paper we ask a straightforward question—is it possible for OPEC to 
achieve its stated goals? That is, can the cartel provide an economic environment 
conducive to development and growth? Since the oil sector represents an important 
share of income for oil exporting, developing countries, instability in the oil market also 
means macroeconomic instability for those countries; thus, has OPEC been a useful tool 
to achieve oil market, and thus macroeconomic, stability? If the answer to these two 
questions is no, what is the rationale for OPEC to continue to exist? In other words, can 
oil exporting developing countries do better in terms of development by joining an oil 
cartel? If so, since all substantial oil exporters can choose to join, why do some 
important exporting countries like Mexico, Oman, Angola and, perhaps, Russia, whose 
production and development levels are similar to other countries in OPEC, choose to 
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stay in the fringe? What induces countries like Ecuador to enter and then leave shortly 
thereafter? Why do Mexico, Russia, Egypt and Kazakhstan find membership 
inconsistent with their domestic macroeconomic policies if membership is, indeed, 
intended to jointly promote stability and economic development?  
There are two important features of the international oil market worthy of 
mention. First, the OPEC cartel meets twice a year, in March and September, and in 
extraordinary sessions whenever it considers such sessions necessary. In those meetings, 
the cartel analyzes the state of the international oil market, and sets quotas for its 
member states (see www.opec.com). Thus, OPEC tries to move (preempt) the market 
rather than be moved by it. OPEC’s production represents about 40% of total world oil 
production. Among non-OPEC producers, Russia’s production is 12% of the world 
production, and no other country produces even 5% of the total. This means that the 
international oil market operates as a Stackleberg oligopoly where the OPEC cartel 
plays the role of the leader. Another important feature that distinguishes the oil cartel 
from most (if not all) other cartels is that governments, and not firms, make the decision 
about joining the cartel.   
Taking these features as assumptions, we answer the above questions in the 
context of a simple model in which oil producing countries choose either to join OPEC 
or remain part of the fringe. Equilibrium is stable and thus the cartel members have no 
temptation to cheat. OPEC acts as a Stackleberg leader, and reacts to market shocks by 
setting the output quotas for its members. We find that if oil producing countries only 
care about high oil sector profits, then joining the cartel is the optimal strategy. But 
countries in the cartel will have more volatile oil production than those in the fringe and 
thus, higher macroeconomic instability. Therefore, if these same governments care 
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about macroeconomic stability as well as oil sector profits, then the choice to join the 
cartel will depend on the intensity of this preference: the more a producer cares about 
macroeconomic stability, the less inclined it is to be a cartel member. Thus, if an oil 
producing country cares about both oil industry profits and macroeconomic stability, the 
goal of macroeconomic stability may be inconsistent with cartel membership.  
The paper proceeds as follows. We first provide a brief discussion of the 
economic performance of the OPEC member states, and examine OPEC’s ability to 
influence the oil market. We then examine how OPEC’s objectives—as specified in its 
mission statement—could be operationalized, write down a model of the cartel and 
analyze its behavior. Finally, we summarize and interpret our results. 
I.  The OPEC Economies 
OPEC was established in 1960 to take sovereign control over oil resources, and to 
ensure that the interests of oil producing countries would be well represented in the 
world markets. The founding members of OPEC felt that their economies were at the 
mercy of the oil companies, and that they were not being adequately compensated for 
the oil the companies were extracting, exporting, and refining. By design, OPEC was to 
establish orderly oil markets, stable prices, and promote the economic development of 
its member states. OPEC’s mission differentiates it from a narrowly defined cartel under 
which joint profits are maximized. That OPEC does not behave strictly like a narrowly 
defined cartel has been found by Griffin (1985), Griffin and Xiong (1997), and Loderer 
(1985), among others. Their results could be explained, in part, by OPEC’s broader 
goals. 
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In comparison with other developing economies, the immensely oil rich 
economies have underperformed. Their economies are characterized by very high 
population growth rates and high rates of oil dependence both in terms of personal 
income and public finance. High extraction rates have led to falling oil reserves. In 
many OPEC member countries, investment, even in the oil sector, is low. Cordesman 
(1999) argues that many oil states do not even have the resources to develop their own 
oil and gas reserves. Yet because of the high level of oil dependence, the oil sector must 
perform well both to maintain current and ensure future living standards (Morrison, 
2004). But, oil sector and overall economic productivity in the OPEC economies has 
declined, and today less rather than more is being produced with the same resources.     
This economic decline has been interpreted by some as evidence that the OPEC 
economies have been victims of the resource curse (Auty, 2001; Eastwood and 
Venables 1982; Gylfason, 2001; Rodriguez and Sachs, 1999; Sachs and Warner, 2001; 
Stevens, 2004), the apparently anomalous empirical finding that many resource rich 
countries under-perform their resource poor peers. The reasons given for the curse are 
many: decline in the terms of trade, revenue volatility, the Dutch disease, crowding out, 
government mismanagement, rent seeking, corruption, etc. But, the end result is the 
same—relative poverty in the midst of plenty.   
We suggest, in contrast, that some of the blame for the economic decline may lie 
in the cartel rather than in the resources it allocates. While OPEC, at least in principle, 
adjusts supply to maintain targeted (nominal) oil prices to maximize oil firm profits, it 
has not been able to control the market adequately to ensure a steady stream of oil 
derived revenues: it has been unable to provide for both consumption today and 
investment to ensure consumption tomorrow.  For example, Venezuela’s public sector 
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oil revenues were 27 percent of GDP in 1996 but only 12.5 percent in 1998 (Barnett and 
Ossowski, 2003). The orderly market, the supposed empirical manifestation of a profit 
oriented pricing policy, is claimed to be a reality (Jalali-Naini and Asali, 2004), but the 
implied real benefits to OPEC members are more like fiction. The tension is this: In a 
highly price-elastic oil market, if OPEC adjusts output to sustain high oil prices, cartel 
members will receive a short-term windfall gain. But the effect of this course of action 
is short-run macroeconomic fluctuations and world economic slowdown, and thus 
diminished rather than enhanced long-run macroeconomic growth prospects. This is as 
true today as it was in the 1970s. When OPEC was founded in the early 1960s, the oil 
market was quite stable and the cartel strategy could work. Yet, with the high oil market 
volatility from the 1970s on, the dual OPEC goals of long-term growth and 
development may not be achievable by a profit-oriented pricing policy.  
II.  Market Equilibrium When Stability Does Not Matter 
Assumptions 
There is a continuum of petroleum producing countries distributed along the interval 
( )1, N .1 These oil industries are controlled by their governments.  
There is a cartel of oil producers which governments can freely choose to join.  
Assume nc countries belong to the cartel while nf = N – nc do not and remain in the 
fringe.  Since oil output in each country is determined by the number of wells drilled 
and the amount of oil underground, it is reasonable to assume that each country’s 
petroleum industry exhibits constant returns to scale technology and has the same cost 
                                                 
1 We assume the continuum modeling for analytical ease. This formulation enables us to avoid 
concentrating attention on corner solutions that have no economic interest. 
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function, ( )tixCC = , where xti is country i’s petroleum production at period t. This 
means that oil production has constant marginal costs. Oil prices are set according to the 
demand function ( ) ttt QfP ε+= , where 0'<f  and 0'' >f , Qt  denotes the world oil 
production and εt is a random term whose expected value is zero and variance is equal 
to 2εσ . The profit function for the petroleum industry at time t in country i is 
( )tititti xCxP −=π , ( )Ni ,1∈ . Suppose, initially, that profits are the only concern; thus, 
the country’s maximization problem is 
(1) Max ( )∑
∞
=
π+0 1
1
t
titr
. 
Assume that shocks are known before oil producers make output decisions, however, 
future shocks are unknown.  
The Fringe 
Firm f in the fringe takes the output of all other petroleum producers as given and 
maximizes (1) to determine its own output. The first order condition for a country in the 
fringe is 
(2) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0'' **** =−+ε+ tftfttt xCxQfQf , 
where the superscript “*” denotes the optimum choice. The second-order condition is: 
(3) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0'''''2 **** <−+ tftftt xCxQfQf   (to be maximum). 
Solving (2), we obtain the follower’s reaction function (country f) to the cartel’s move: 
(4) ( )ttftf Kx εφ= ,** , 
where ∑
=
= c
n
c
tct xK
1
**  is the cartel’s oil production in period t. Using (2), we obtain the 
partial derivative of xtf with respect to tK  and denote it by 
f
cφ , that is, 
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(5) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )****
***
'''''2
'''
tfttft
ttft
t
f
f
c xCQfxQf
QfxQf
K −+
+−=∂
φ∂=φ .  
From (3), the denominator is negative, thus 
0<φ fc   if and only if  ( ) ( ) 0''' *** <+ tft QfxQf . 
When reaction functions are upward sloping, 0>φ fc , there is a situation in which 
followers copy or undercut the leader like, for example, entrants undercutting the price 
of the incumbent in the contestable market literature (Baumol, 1982) or followers in the 
development stage that invest more than the leader and are thus more likely to collect a 
patent in a research and development game (Reinganum, 1985). On the other hand, 
when reaction functions are downward sloping, 0<φ fc , the leader makes a preemptive 
move, like an incumbent firm that invests in excess supply (Spence, 1979; Dixit, 1980). 
OPEC’s operating procedure, semiannual plus extraordinary meetings, is to preempt the 
market. 
The Cartel 
For the sake of simplicity, assume that countries on the interval (1,  nc] are in the cartel 
and countries on the interval (nc,  N] are in the fringe. The leader takes into account the 
follower’s reaction function (4), so it chooses xti for each cartel member to maximize 
( )∑ ∫∞
= = ⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −+=
ts
n
c
scssss
s
iti xCKKQfEV
1
)(εβ . 
Since ffss nKQ φ+= , the first order condition for every country c in the cartel is: 
(6) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0''1 **** =−φ++ε+ tctfcfttt xCQfnKQf . 
Since all countries are equal except for their membership in the cartel, we may consider 
symmetric equilibria, so xtc is the same for every cartel member and xtf is the same for 
every country in the fringe. 
 10
Theorem 1: Suppose that the slope of the reaction function fcφ  is continuous, monotonic 
and well-defined for 1 < nc ≤ N; then there is a Nash equilibrium with cartel size equal 
to *cn  and the number of countries in the fringe equal to 
**
cf nNn −=  such that 
( )**
*1
cc
cf
c nNn
n
−
−=φ . In that Nash equilibrium, each country in the cartel produces the same 
amount of oil and obtains the same profit as a country in the fringe, *** fc xxx == . That 
is, fc xx ≥  if and only if fc π≥π . 
 
Proof: See Appendix  
To illustrate the theorem, consider Figure 1, where for the sake of simplicity, we have 
assumed that fcφ  is constant. Although the assumption made in Theorem 1 about fcφ  is 
more general, it is noteworthy that 
f
cφ  is constant if the demand function is linear and 
oil exploitation technology is constant returns to scale. 
Define 
( ) ( )cc
c
c nNn
nnB −
−= 1
 and 
*
cn  as the size of the cartel such that ( ) fccnB φ=* .   
If the cartel size is greater than *cn , the cartel’s market power is strong but each 
cartel member produces ** fc xx < . Once the cartel sets the quotas to target some price 
level, it is optimal for cartel members to cheat, that is, to imitate producers in the fringe 
and thus increase their production. The cartel’s market power weakens and cheating 
countries do not benefit from belonging to the cartel. If cartel members are subject to 
some cost, like bargaining costs or moral punishments, they are better off if they quit. 
On the other hand, if the cartel size is less than *cn , then 
**
fc xx >  and profits are higher 
for cartel members. Producers in the fringe will find it optimal to join the cartel to gain 
from its market power. A Nash equilibrium is reached once the cartel has reached its 
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optimal size *cn  where cartel members have no incentive to cheat since equilibrium 
output and profit is the same for countries both in the cartel and the fringe. Therefore, 
the cartel solution is stable. 
III. Market Equilibrium When Stability Matters  
In the previous section’s analysis, we assume that decision makers only care about the 
oil firm profits, and find a cartel size which constitutes a Nash equilibrium where there 
is no temptation to cheat. In practice, however, governments make the decision about 
joining the oil cartel. Thus, if membership in the cartel means more unstable production, 
a developing oil-exporting country’s government that cares about the oil production 
stability, and hence macroeconomic stability, may decide to quit the cartel. Yet, why 
may a government give weight to oil output stability in their objective function? There 
are several reasons. 
First, the OPEC charter states that the cartel countries care not only about profits 
from the oil industry, but also about creating an appropriate environment for investment 
and growth. Therefore, macroeconomic stability must be an issue. 
Second, when access to international capital markets is imperfect, countries face 
a trade-off between higher oil profits and macroeconomic stability. To illustrate this, let 
( )∑∞
=
+=
0i
itCUW  be the inter-temporal utility function of country i’s representative agent, 
which is subject to a budget constraint like ( ) 11 −++=+ tttt BrYBC , where Bt is bonds, 
Yt is output and r is the real interest rate. Under reasonable functional assumptions, 
welfare is optimized along the consumption smoothing path CCC tt == −1 . In this 
situation, individuals borrow when the oil market is down and vice versa. Yet, if the 
country has no access to international capital markets, its local financial institutions are 
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weak, and/or it suffers from strong political business cycle problems, which is the usual 
case in emerging markets (Jeanne 2003, Litan et al. 2003 and Sy 2003), the 
consumption smoothing path may not be feasible anymore, and the solution to the 
maximization problem becomes tt YC = , that is, consumption follows the cycle. 
Therefore, although joining the cartel may provide a higher average income to the 
typical oil exporting country, it may also generate more macroeconomic instability, 
which diminishes welfare. Therefore, the government faces a trade-off between having 
higher income and macroeconomic stability. 
Third, for the typical oil-exporting developing country, stability in the number of 
barrels produced also provides more stability to the oil industry's local suppliers making 
investment in those related sectors less risky, and thus helping the development of areas 
in which the country should have natural comparative advantages. Finally, every time 
the oil industry (plus its multiplier effect) adjusts output, it lays off workers. Thus, a 
government that cares about employment stability should worry about stabilizing the 
number of barrels it produces.  
Therefore, since the cartel implicitly determines the output level at which profits 
and thus income are maximized by setting the number of barrels extracted, it is 
reasonable to define the following objective function for a government that cares about 
both firm’s profit and oil output stability: 
( )∑∞
=
− ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −δ−πβ= ts isiiis
s
itit xxEV
2
1, .  
Here iβ  is the time-preference parameter for country i, πis is the oil firms’ profit, the 
term ( )21, isi xx −−  accounts for the loss due to the instability in the oil production (a 
proxy for the variance of the GDP gap), and iδ  is the weight that the government gives 
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to output instability in the objective function. With this objective function, equations (2) 
and (6) become: 
(7a) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ftffftftfttt xxxCxQfQf −δβ=−+ε+ ***** 2''  and 
(7b) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −δβ=−φ++ε+ ****** 2''1 ctccctctfcfttt xxxCQfnKQf , 
where ix  and iπ  denote country i’s optimal oil production and the profits of the oil 
industry in steady state equilibrium, respectively.   
Theorem 2: When the government values oil sector stability, then: 
i) the following three statements are equivalent: 
(a) fc xx ≥ , (b) fc π≥π , and (c) ( )cc
cf
c nNn
n
−
−≤φ 1 ; 
ii) given *cn , then cx  and fx , and thus cπ  and cπ  are independent of β and δ. 
Proof: See Appendix 
Theorem 3: i)  Oil output is positively correlated across countries. 
ii) The oil output variance is a decreasing function of the time 
preference parameter (β) and the spillover effect on the non-oil sector 
(δ). 
Proof: See Appendix 
 
This means that, ceteris paribus, cartel and fringe producers respond to a positive 
demand shock by increasing output. It also means that volatility in oil production 
decreases the higher the time preference parameter (higher β), and the stronger the 
spillover effect of oil production volatility on the non-oil sector (higher δ). Thus, care 
for macroeconomic stability reduces countries’ willingness to accept a highly variable 
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production quota. These facts may induce governments to change their decision about 
joining the cartel. 
Theorem 4: Assume that oil production exhibits constant returns to scale, that the 
reaction functions are negatively sloped, and that δ > 0. Consider two identical 
producers except that one belongs to the cartel and the other is in the fringe, then: 
(i) the oil output variance is higher for a producer in the cartel than the identical 
producer in the fringe 022 >σ−σ fc ;  
(ii) the difference 22 fc σ−σ  is a decreasing function of β and δ; and 
(iii)the difference between the average profit for the producer in the cartel and 
the producer in the fringe, fc π−π , decreases as the cartel size increases. 
Proof: See Appendix 
The intuition behind this result is that the cartel uses its higher market power to obtain a 
higher profit as it faces a demand shock. That gain is lower the more a country cares for 
macroeconomic stability. 
Consider a country deciding whether or not to join the cartel from period t on. 
The expected profit of the oil industry is cπ  if it joins the cartel, or fπ  if it stays in the 
fringe. Country i’s objective function can be written as 
( )[ ]iiiii
i
iV δβσδ−πβ−= ,1
1 2 . 
Let Vc denote the country’s net gain if it joins the cartel and Vf if it stays in the fringe. 
Country i joins the cartel if Vc > Vf, that is, if 
(8) ( )δβ>π−π ,Zfc , 
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where ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]δβσ−δβσδ=δβ ,,, 22 fcZ . The term ( )fc π−π  measures the gain in expected 
profits and ( )δβ,Z  measures the loss due in macroeconomic instability if the country is 
in the cartel instead of in the fringe. From Theorem 4, the difference ( )fc π−π  is a 
decreasing function of nc that cuts the axis at *cc nn = , as shown in Figure 2. The number 
of countries that join the cartel depends on the countries’ distribution across the 
parameters β and δ.   
To get some insights, define the index set for the N countries in such a way that 
( )iiZ δβ ,  is a continuous increasing function of ( )Ni ,0∈ . From Figure 2, we observe 
that inequality (8) holds for the first **cn  countries; those with 
**
cni <  join the cartel, and 
the other **** cf nNn −=  remain in the fringe. From Theorem 4(ii), ( ) 0, ≥δβZ , and thus 
there exists an equilibrium in which some producers join the cartel and some others 
decide to stay in the fringe. If δ = 0, then ( ) 0, =δβZ  and equilibrium is reached when 
the cartel size equals *cn  as in Theorem 1. Yet, if δ > 0, equilibrium is reached for a 
cartel size equal to **cn  smaller than 
*
cn , that is, the cartel size is smaller when some 
countries care for macroeconomic stabilization than in the special case when 
stabilization does not matter. 
The dynamic of the cartel in this model can be seen as a repeated game, where 
players are free to choose the strategy of whether or not to join the cartel; they are free 
to “cheat” and condition (8) defines equilibrium. Consider a country that joins the 
cartel, so (8) holds. If the country imitates the fringe’s behavior, it is not punished, but 
its loss in terms of profits is too high since it does not maximize (1) and thus it will be 
worse off:  the cartel is internally stable. Similarly, a country in the fringe will not want 
to imitate a country in the cartel since the cost in macroeconomic instability is too high. 
 16
Therefore, a country joins the cartel if it is committed to keep its quota, and thus the 
cartel solution defined by (8) is a stable equilibrium.2 
What are the features of those countries that join the cartel? Given δ, from 
Theorem 4(ii), 22 fc σ−σ  is a decreasing function of time-preference factor β. Therefore, 
countries with a low time-preference factor β, which have a strong preference for 
current consumption and low investment-output ratios, give little importance to future 
losses due to macroeconomic instability, and so ( )δβ,Z  is small. For them, inequality 
(8) holds. They are likely to join the cartel. 
The analysis of the parameter δ requires a more detailed analysis. Given β, since 
22
fc σ−σ  is a decreasing function of δ, ( )δβ,Z  has the shape shown in Figure 3(a). Thus, 
countries with either low δ ( )1δ<  or very high δ ( )2δ>  join the cartel. If δ is low, either 
the impact of oil output instability on the non-oil sector is low or the non-oil sector is 
rather small. This could be the case in countries whose non-oil sector is highly rural.  
These countries put a priority on the well-being of their oil industry and join the cartel.  
On the other hand, countries with a very high δ have much to lose from spillover effects 
that instability in oil production cause in the non-oil sector, and will join the cartel only 
if their quota is insensitive to demand shocks, diminishing the instability effect. 
Finally, let us consider the effect of market volatility on the cartel size. It is 
apparent that ( )δβ,Z  is a decreasing function of the variance of ε; thus, if the oil market 
is very unstable, the variance of ε is big, and equilibrium will be as shown in Figure 
3(a), where some countries find it beneficial to join the cartel and others do not. Yet, if 
                                                 
2 Here we follow the definition of a stable cartel as suggested in D’Aspremont et al. (1983), Donsimoni et 
al. (1986), Jacquemin and Slade (1989) and Marette and Crespi (2003). 
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market volatility is low and the variance of ε is too small, ( )δβ,Z  will be as shown in 
Figure 3(b), and all countries join the cartel. 
IV. Conclusions 
A distinguishing feature of the international oil market is that the decision about joining 
the OPEC cartel is not taken by firms, but by governments that take macroeconomic 
considerations, namely development and stabilization, into account. This essay studies 
the issue of whether the cartel has been a useful tool for those purposes in the context of 
a Stackleberg type model in which oil exporting, developing countries decide whether 
or not to join the cartel. The model leads to four important conclusions. The first is that 
countries with a strong preference for current consumption join the cartel. The reasons 
for this preference may vary across countries: in Kuwait, for instance, it may be due to 
the high population growth rate (4.9% annually during the last 10 years), while in Iraq it 
may have been due to the need for current income to finance several wars during 
Saddam’s regime. A strong preference for current consumption (low β) is reflected in 
relatively low investment/output ratios and poor economic performance in terms of long 
term per capita output growth. This could account for the economic performance in 
countries (see Table 1) like Kuwait, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia or Venezuela, 
whose investment/output ratios have been less than 20% during the last decade. The 
decision to join the cartel and the exigencies of cartel, as opposed to macroeconomic, 
stability has cursed rather than blessed them.  
Second, countries whose non-oil sectors either show low vulnerability to the 
variance in oil production or are small relative to the oil sector will also join the cartel. 
This would be the case, for example, for countries with a large rural sector, such as Iran 
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where the agricultural sector represents over 20% of the GDP. Yet not only countries 
with low vulnerability to the oil output variance will join the cartel. There is a third 
reason. Since the oil-output variance is a source of macroeconomic instability, countries 
with very large non-oil sectors or that are highly vulnerable to the oil output variance 
(high δ) are better off enjoying cartel prices and at the same time having low oil-output 
variances. Therefore, if their quotas exhibit low variances, it would be beneficial for 
them to join the cartel. This could explain Indonesia’s, and to a lesser extent Iran’s, 
OPEC membership, since their oil production to GDP ratios are small and the 
correlations between their oil production and the cartel’s are rather low. Finally, we 
conclude that all oil exporting countries would find it beneficial to join the cartel if the 
volatility of the oil market were low. This could explain why, for example, when OPEC 
was set up in the early 1960s, all important oil exporters at that time joined the cartel, 
and why many of these countries enjoyed high growth rates during the 1960s. The case 
of Venezuela exemplifies this. After enjoying an average growth rate above 5% per year 
between 1945 and 1973, one of the highest growth rates in the world, its average growth 
rate from 1978 on, just after the oil market volatility became a serious concern for 
producing countries, has been close to zero. 
What about the countries in the fringe? A glance at Table 2 shows that all 
producers whose oil exports are less than 600 thousand barrels per day are in the fringe. 
However, except for Denmark, oil production is still an important share of their GDPs.  
Thus, they can take advantage of oil industry windfalls generated by the cartel’s 
leadership role without being members of the cartel. But, this is at the recognized cost 
of letting their non-oil sector suffer the swings of the oil market. This could be also the 
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case for Russia, Mexico and Angola, whose oil output variances are moderately 
correlated with OPEC.  
The reader may wonder at this point why highly industrialized countries, whose 
non-oil sectors are very large and highly vulnerable to the swings of the oil market (high 
δ), do not join the cartel. For these countries, oil is an important input and high oil 
prices have an important negative effect on their economic growth rates. Therefore, they 
will always avoid joining a cartel.3 We do not include this effect in the model since it is 
not important when dealing with oil-dependent developing economies. In fact, a typical 
feature of oil exporting developing economies is that energy is quite cheap because of 
excess supply, or, most often, because its energy sector is highly subsidized. This is 
definitely not the case for Canada, Norway or the U.K. 
Is OPEC an appropriate tool to foster economic development?  In an oil market 
with low volatility, like that prevailing before the 1970s, oil exporting countries may 
enjoy a high flow of financial resources and enough macroeconomic stability to foster 
investment and development; this could also be the case of countries like Indonesia, 
whose oil sector enjoys the advantages of cartel prices, but has a low variance quota 
inside the cartel that benefits its large non-oil sector. Yet, this is not the case in the 
volatile oil market of today, where the non-oil sectors of OPEC countries are hindered 
because of its hunger for current profits. For them, current profligacy begets future 
decline. 
 
                                                 
3 Harkness (1984) and Garratt et al. (2003) explore the macroeconomic consequences for oil exporting 
industrialized economies. 
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TABLE 1 
SOME STATISTICS ON OPEC COUNTRIES 1993–2002 
 
 
Average. 
exports 
(thousands 
barrels per 
day) (1) 
Correlation 
with OPEC 
exports 
Per Capita 
Growth 
(%) (2) 
Ratio Oil 
Output / 
GDP (%) 
(2) 
Share of 
Oil on 
Exports 
(%) (3) 
Share of 
Oil on Tax 
Revenues 
(%) (3) 
Ratio 
Investment 
/ GDP 
(%) (3) 
Population 
Growth  
(%) (2) 
Algeria 1,214 0.51 0.45 31.3 96.8 64.6 15.8 1.8 
Indonesia 629 -0.17 2.40 8.8 21.8 25.0 25.0 1.4 
Iran 2,472 0.01 2.29 7.9 80.8 52.6 24.9 1.5 
Iraq (4) 1,052 0.78 -1.16 -- 95.0 -- -- 2.4 
Kuwait 1,876 0.23 0.16 46.7 91.8 64.8 13.6 4.9 
Libya 1,237 0.19 -0.92 -- 93.7 59.6 12.8 1.9 
Nigeria 1,815 0.90 -0.52 41.0 96.0 20.9 19.9 2.7 
Qatar (4) 649 0.76 -- 55.0 85.0 70.0 -- 2.0 
Saudi Arabia 7,686 0.18 -0.81 45.0 90.0 75.0 19.1 2.7 
U. Arab 
Emirates 2,108 0.87 -0.17 23.5 48.7 63.9 -- 4.3 
Venezuela 2,662 0.88 -1.58 26.1 82.2 55.4 17.3 2.1 
Source:  
(1) USA Department of Energy;  
(2) World Bank;  
(3) IMF Country Reports;  
(4) CIA World Factbook 
 
Note: All statistics show the average between 1998 and 2002, except for average exports, 
which is between 1992 and 2002. 
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TABLE 2 
NON-OPEC EXPORTS AND CORRELATION WITH OPEC PRODUCTION 
PERIOD 1993–2002 
 
Average exports 
thousands of 
barrels per day 
Correlation with 
OPEC exports 
Russia 3,746 0.31 
Norway 2,880 0.68 
Mexico 1,446 0.51 
United Kingdom 906 0.47 
Oman 837 0.85 
Canada 673 0.51 
Angola 667 0.50 
Egypt 377 -0.52 
Colombia 369 0.75 
Kazakhstan 354 0.43 
Argentina 342 0.61 
Gabon 312 0.07 
Malaysia 310 0.22 
Syria 310 -0.53 
Yemen 300 0.65 
Ecuador 259 -0.02 
Congo (Brazzaville) 227 0.87 
Brunei 177 0.53 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 110 -0.63 
Vietnam 101 0.56 
Azerbaijan 89 0.51 
Equatorial Guinea 82 0.51 
Cameroon 81 -0.21 
Papua New Guinea 74 -0.60 
Turkmenistan 60 0.54 
Denmark 46 0.47 
Sudan 36 0.36 
Bahrain 24 -0.35 
Source: USA Department of Energy 
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FIGURE 1 
THE SIZE OF THE CARTEL WHEN STABILITY DOES NOT MATTER 
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FIGURE 2 
EQUILIBRIUM CARTEL SIZE 
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FIGURE 3 
EQUILIBRIUM CARTEL SIZE 
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Theorem 1: Let us first prove that ( )cc
cf
c nNn
n
−
−≤φ 1  if and only if ** fc xx ≥ . 
Consider the profit function, ( )( ) ( )xCxQf T −ε+=π . Suppose that one country decided 
to change its own output without consulting the cartel, then 
(A1) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )xCxQfQfx TT ''' −+ε+=π . 
From (2), π reaches a maximum at *fx , and thus (A1) equals zero; therefore ( ) 0' * =π fx , 
and ** fc xx ≥  if and only if ( ) ( )** ''0 cf xx π≥π= . Using (A1) and (6), this occurs if and only 
if ( ) ( ) ( )**** ''0'1' ccccfcc xCxffxCnfxnf −+ε+≤=−φ++ε+ . With a bit of algebra and 
rearranging, we have ( )cc
cf
c nNn
n
−
−≤φ 1 . 
We now prove the equivalence between ** fc xx ≥  and ( ) ( )** fc xx π≥π . Consider the 
profit function ( )( ) ( )xCxQf T −ε+=π . From the mean value Theorem, there exists xn 
between *cx  and 
*
fx  such that ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )nfcfc xxxxx π′−=π−π **** . Therefore, 
(A2) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )nTfcfc xCQfxxxx ′−ε+−=π−π **** . 
Yet, ( ) ( ) ( )xCQfx T ′−ε+=π'  is the difference between price and marginal cost. If xce is 
the competitive equilibrium, then ( ) 0' =π cex , but in this case all firms have market 
power and so, ( ) 0' * >π cx  and ( ) 0' * >π fx . Since xn is between *cx  and *fx , it must be that 
( ) 0' >π nx  is positive and so: 
( ) ( )** fc xx π≥π   if and only if  ** fc xx ≥ . 
Therefore, if ( )cc
cf
c nNn
n
−
−>φ 1 , profits for cartel members are greater than profits for 
producers in the fringe, and thus more countries want to join the cartel. On the other 
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hand, if ( )cc
cf
c nNn
n
−
−<φ 1 , cartel members have temptation to cheat and thus behave as 
producers in the fringe. A Nash equilibrium is reached for *cn  such that ( )**
*1
cc
cf
c nNn
n
−
−>φ . 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Theorem 2:  
These statements follow from Theorem 1, since in this case εt = 0 and equations (7a) 
and (7b) reduce to (2) and (6). 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Theorem 3: Consider the oil production volatility between cartel and non-cartel 
members. From (7a) and (7b) we have 
(A3) ( ) ( ) ( ) fftftfttttf xCxQfQf
x
δβ−−+
−=ε∂
∂
2'''''2
1
**
*
 
and 
(A4)  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) cctctfcfcfccfttfcfttttc xCQfnnnKQfnKQf
x
δβ−−φ++φ+φ++
−=ε∂
∂
2'''1''1'
1
*
*
. 
From the second order conditions for firms in the fringe and in the cartel respectively, 
the denominators are negative and thus both terms are positive. Thus, producers in both 
the cartel and the fringe respond similarly to demand shocks. This proves (3i). By taking 
cross derivatives on (A3) and (A4) with respect to βδ, we have 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 2**
*2
2'''''22 −δβ−−+−=βδ∂ε∂
∂
fftftftt
t
tf xCxQfQf
x
  and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]2*
*2
2'''1''1'
2
cctct
f
cfc
f
ccftt
f
cfttt
tc
xCQfnnnKQfnKQf
x
δβ−−φ++φ+φ++
−=βδ∂ε∂
∂
. 
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Both expressions are negative. This proves the theorem. 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Theorem 4: From (7a) and (7b), we have  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]2
22
2
''
4
1
tftfttttftfttf xCxQfQfExxExVar −+ε+δβ=−= , and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]2
22
2
''1
4
1
tct
f
cfttttctcttc xCQfnKQfExxExVar −φ++ε+δβ=−= . 
Now,  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }''2''4 2222 fxCfxfCfExVar tfttftttf −ε+++−ε+=δβ  and 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ){ }'1'2'1'4 2222 fnKCffnKCfExVar fcfttfcfttttc φ+−ε++φ++−ε+=δβ
. 
Thus, with a bit of algebra, we find that ( ) ( )tftc xVarxVar >  if  
( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]{ } 0'2'1'1 >−ε++φ++φ+− CffnKfxnKxE tfcfttffcfttft , that is, if 
( )[ ]( ) ( )[ ]{ } 01 >−+−φ+− ftfctcfcfttft xxxxnKxE . 
Yet, ( ) ( )ftfctc xxxx −+−  increases as ε increases. Thus, this covariance is positive if 
( )fcfttf nKx φ+− 1  is an increasing function of ε. Yet,  
(A5) ( )[ ] ( ) ε∂φ∂+φ+ε∂∂−ε∂∂=φ+−ε∂∂
f
c
ft
f
cf
tc
c
tff
cfttf nKn
xn
x
nKx 11 . 
From Theorem 3, 0>ε∂
∂ tfx  and 0>ε∂
∂ tcx , and from (5), it is easy to check that 
01 <φ+ fcfn , so, the first two terms are positive. Yet, from (5), 
( ) 0''/'2 ''/'2 2* >+−=ε∂φ∂ ffx fftf
f
c . Thus, (A5) is positive. This proves part (i). 
Now, consider the difference 22 fc σ−σ . From (7a) and (7b), 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ){ }2222 ''''14 1 CfxfCfnKfxVarxVar tftfcftttftc −+ε+−−φ++ε+δβ=− , 
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which decreases with respect to β and δ. This proves (ii). 
Denote ( ) ( )** fc xx π−π=π∆  and ** fc xxx −=∆ . Then we can rewrite (A2) as 
( ) ( )( )nT xCQfx ′−ε+∆=π∆ . Taking derivatives with respect to nc,  
( ) ( )( )
c
T
nT
cc n
QxfxCQf
n
x
n ∂
∂∆+′−ε+∂
∆∂=∂
π∆∂ ' .  
Yet ( ) fctT xnNKQ −+= , and thus xn
Q
c
∆=∂
∂ . Therefore,  
( ) ( )( ) ( )2' fcnT
cc
xxfxCQf
n
x
n
−+′−ε+∂
∆∂=∂
π∆∂ . 
From the proof of Theorem 1, ( ) ( ) 0>′−ε+ nT xCQf  and 0<∂∆∂ cn
x , therefore, 0<∂
π∆∂
cn
. 
This proves (iii). 
Q.E.D. 
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